

U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
N.D. OF N.Y.  
FILED

AUG 18 2010

LAWRENCE K. BAERMAN, CLERK  
ALBANY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

**Enid Futterman**

Plaintiff,

vs.

**Washington Mutual Bank, FA**

Defendant

Case # **10-CV-1002**

LEK / DRH

PETITION FOR TEMPORARY  
INJUNCTION

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Comes now Enid Futterman, hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner," and moves the court for relief as herein requested:

**PARTIES**

Petitioner is Enid Futterman, 661 Route 23 Craryville NY 12521. Currently Known  
Defendant(s) are/is: Washington Mutual Bank, FA

**STATEMENT OF CAUSE**

Petitioner, entered into a consumer contract for the refinance of a primary residence located at 661 Route 23, hereinafter referred to as the "property."  
Defendants, acting in concert and collusion with others, induced Petitioner to enter into a predatory loan agreement with Defendant.  
Defendants committed numerous acts of fraud against Petitioner in furtherance of a carefully crafted scheme intended to defraud Petitioner.  
Defendants failed to make proper notices to Petitioner that would have given Petitioner warning of the types of tactics used by Defendants to defraud Petitioner.  
Defendants charged false fees to Petitioner at settlement.

24 Defendants used the above referenced false fees to compensate agents of Petitioner in order to  
25 induce said agents to breach their fiduciary duty to Petitioner.

26 Defendant's attorney caused to be initiated collection procedures, knowing said collection  
27 procedures in the instant action were frivolous as lender is estopped from collection procedures,  
28 under authority of Uniform Commercial Code 3-501, subsequent to the request by Petitioner for  
29 the production of the original promissory note alleged to create a debt.

30 **IN BRIEF**

31 *(Non-factual Statement of Posture and Position)*

32 It is not the intent of Petitioner to indict the entire industry. It is just that Plaintiff will be  
33 making a number of allegations that, outside the context of the current condition of the real  
34 estate industry, may seem somewhat outrageous and counter-intuitive.

35 When Petitioner accuses ordinary individuals of acting in concert and collusion with an  
36 ongoing criminal conspiracy, it tends to trigger an incredulous response as it is  
37 unreasonable to consider that all Agents, loan agents, appraisers, and other ordinary  
38 people, just doing what they have been trained to do, are out to swindle the poor  
39 unsuspecting borrower.

40 The facts Petitioner is prepared to prove are that Petitioner has been harmed by fraud  
41 committed by people acting in concert and collusion, one with the other. Petitioner has no  
42 reason to believe that the Agent, loan officer, appraiser, and others were consciously aware  
43 that what they were doing was part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy, only that it was,  
44 and they, at the very least, kept themselves negligently uninformed of the wrongs they  
45 were perpetrating. Petitioner maintains the real culprit is the system itself, including the  
46 courts, for failure to strictly enforce the consumer protection laws.

47 **CAREFULLY CRAFTED CRIMINAL CONNIVANCE**

48 *(General State of the Real Estate Industry)*

49 ***THE BEST OF INTENTIONS***

50 Prior to the 1980's and 1990's ample government protections were in place to protect  
51 consumers and the lending industry from precisely the disaster we now experience.  
52 During President Clinton's administration, under the guise of making housing available to

53 the poor, primary protections were relaxed which had the effect of releasing the  
 54 unscrupulous on the unwary.

55 Prior to deregulation in the 1980's, lenders created loans for which they held and assumed  
 56 the risk. Consequently, Americans were engaged in safe and stable home mortgages.  
 57 With the protections removed, the unscrupulous lenders swooped in and, instead of  
 58 making loans available to the poor, used the opportunity to convince the unsophisticated  
 59 American public to do something that had been traditionally taboo; home buyers were  
 60 convinced to speculate with their homes, their most important investment.

61 Washington Mutual Bank, PA , Ameriquist, Countrywide, and many others swooped in  
 62 and convinced Americans to sell their homes, get out of their safe mortgage agreements,  
 63 and speculate with the equity they had gained by purchasing homes they could not afford.  
 64 Lenders created loans intended to fail as, under the newly crafted system, the Lender  
 65 profited more from a mortgage default than from a stable loan.

66 Companies cropped up who called themselves banks when, in fact, they were only either  
 67 subsidiaries of banks, or unaffiliated companies that were operated for the purpose of  
 68 creating and selling promissory notes. As will be demonstrated, these companies then  
 69 profited from the failure of the underlying loans.

#### 70 ***HOW IT WORKS***

71 Briefly, how it works is this, the Lender would secure a large loan from a large bank,  
 72 convert that loan into 20 and 30 year mortgages and then sell the promise to pay to an  
 73 investor.

74 People would set up mortgage companies buy securing a large loan from one of the major  
 75 banks, then convert that loan into 20 and 30 year mortgages. In order to accomplish this  
 76 an Agent would contract with a seller to find a buyer, bring both seller and buyer to a  
 77 lender who would secure the title from the seller using the borrowed bank funds for that  
 78 purpose, and then trade the title to the buyer in exchange for a promissory note.

79 The lender then creates a 20 or 30 year mortgage with money the lender must repay within  
 80 6 months. As soon as the closing is consummated, the promissory note is sold to an  
 81 investor pool.

82 Using the instant case as an example, a \$665,000.00 note at 5.0970%% interest over 30  
 83 years will produce \$478,498.98 The lender can then offer to the investor the security

84 instrument (promissory note) at say 50% of it's future value. The investor will, over the  
85 life of the note, less approximately 3.00% servicing fees, realize \$639,791.85 . The lender  
86 can then pay back the bank and retain a handsome profit in the amount of \$14,366.61. The  
87 lender, however, is not done with the deal.

88 The lender signed over the promissory note to the investor at the time of the trade, but did  
89 not sign over the lien document (mortgage or deed of trust). The State of Kansas Supreme  
90 Court addressed this issue and stated that such a transaction was certainly legal. However,  
91 it created a fatal flaw as the holder of the lien document, at time of sale of the security  
92 instrument, received consideration in excess of the lien amount. Since the lien holder  
93 received consideration, he could not be harmed. Therefore the lien became an  
94 unenforceable document.

95 This begs the question: if keeping the lien would render it void, why would the lender not  
96 simply transfer the lien with the promissory note? The reason is because the lender will  
97 hold the lien for three years, file an Internal Revenue Service Form 1099a, claim the full  
98 amount of the lien as abandoned funds, and deduct the full amount from the lender's tax  
99 liability. The lender, by this maneuver, gets consideration a second time. And still the  
100 lender is not done profiting from the deal.

101 After sale of the promissory note, the lender remains as the servicer for the investor. The  
102 lender will receive 3% of each payment the lender collects and renders to the investor  
103 pool. However, if the payment is late, the lender is allowed to assess an extra 5% and keep  
104 that amount. Also, if the loan defaults, the lender stands to gain thousands for handling the  
105 foreclosure.

106 The lender stands to profit more from a note that is overly expensive, than from a good  
107 stable loan. And where, you may ask, does all this profit come from? It comes from the  
108 equity the borrower had built up in the home. And still the lender is not finished profiting  
109 from the deal.

110 Another nail was driven in the American financial coffin when on the last day Congress  
111 was in session in 2000 when restrictions that had been in place since the economic  
112 collapse of 1907 were removed. Until 1907 investors were allowed to bet on stocks  
113 without actually buying them. This unbridled speculation led directly to an economic  
114 collapse. As a result the legislature banned the practice, until the year 2000. In 2000 the  
115 unscrupulous lenders got their way on the last day of the congressional session. Congress

116 removed the restriction banning derivatives and again allowed the practice, this time  
117 taking only 8 years to crash the stock market. This practice allowed the lender to profit  
118 further from the loan by betting on the failure of the security instrument he had just sold to  
119 the unwary investor, thus furthering the purpose of the lender to profit from both the  
120 borrower (consumer) and the investor.

121 The failure of so many loans recently resulted in a seven hundred and fifty billion dollar  
122 bailout at the expense of the taxpayer. The unsuspecting consumer was lulled into  
123 accepting the pronouncements of the lenders, appraisers, underwriters, and trustees as all  
124 were acting under the guise of government regulation and, therefore, the borrower had  
125 reason to expect good and fair dealings from all. Unfortunately, the regulations in place to  
126 protect the consumer from just this kind of abuse were simply being ignored.

127 The loan origination fee from the HUD1 settlement statement is the finder's fee paid for  
128 the referral of the client to the lender by a person acting as an agent for the borrower.  
129 Hereinafter, the person or entity who receives any portion of the yield spread premium, or  
130 a commission of any kind consequent to securing the loan agreement through from the  
131 borrower will be referred to as "Agent." The fee, authorized by the consumer protection  
132 law is restricted to 1% of the principal of the note. It was intended that the Agent, when  
133 seeking out a lender for the borrower, would seek the best deal for his client rather than  
134 who would pay him the most. That was the intent, but not the reality. The reality is that  
135 Agents never come away from the table with less than 2% or 3% of the principal. This is  
136 accomplished by undisclosed fees to the Agent in order to induce the Agent to breach his  
137 fiduciary duty to the borrower and convince the borrower to accept a more expensive loan  
138 product than the borrower qualifies for. This will generate more profits for the lender and,  
139 consequently, for the Agent.

140 It is a common practice for lenders to coerce appraisers to give a higher appraisal than is  
141 the fair market price. This allows the lender to increase the cost of the loan product and  
142 give the impression that the borrower is justified in making the purchase.

143 The lender then charges the borrower an underwriting fee in order to convince the  
144 borrower that someone with knowledge has gone over the conditions of the note and  
145 certified that they meet all legal criteria. The trustee, at closing, participates actively in the  
146 deception of the borrower by placing undue stress on the borrower to sign the large stack  
147 of paperwork without reading it. The trustee is, after all, to be trusted and has been paid to

insure the transaction. This trust is systematically violated for the purpose of taking unfair advantage of the borrower. The entire loan process is a carefully crafted contrive connivance designed and intended to induce the unsophisticated borrower into accepting a loan product that is beyond the borrowers means to repay. With all this, it should be a surprise to no one that this country is having a real estate crisis.

# **PETITIONER WILL PROVE THE FOLLOWING**

Petitioner is prepared to prove, by a preponderance of evidence that:

- Lender has no legal standing to bring collection or foreclosure claims against the property;
- Lender is not a real party in interest in any contract which can claim a collateral interest in the property;
- even if Lender were to prove up a contract to which Lender had standing to enforce against Petitioner, no valid lien exists which would give Lender a claim against the property;
- even if Lender were to prove up a contract to which Lender had standing to enforce against Petitioner, said contract was fraudulent in its creation as endorsement was secured by acts of negligence, common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure, fraud in the inducement, fraud in the execution, usury, and breaches of contractual and fiduciary obligations by Mortgagee or "Trustee" on the Deed of Trust, "Mortgage Agents," "Loan Originators," "Loan Seller," "Mortgage Aggregator," "Trustee of Pooled Assets," "Trustee or officers of Structured Investment Vehicle," "Investment Banker," "Trustee of Special Purpose Vehicle/Issuer of Certificates of 'Asset-Backed Certificates,'" "Seller of 'Asset-Backed' Certificates (shares or bonds)," "Special Servicer" and Trustee, respectively, of certain mortgage loans pooled together in a trust fund;
- Defendants have concocted a carefully crafted connivance wherein Lender conspired with Agents, et al, to strip Petitioner of Petitioner's equity in the property by inducing Plaintiff to enter into a predatory loan inflated loan product;
- Lender received unjust enrichment in the amount of 5% of each payment made late to Lender while Lender and Lender's assigns acted as servicer of the note;

- 178 • Lender and Lender's assigns, who acted as servicer in place of Lender, profited by  
179 handling the foreclosure process on a contract Lender designed to have a high  
180 probability of default;
- 181 • Lender intended to defraud Investor by converting the promissory note into a  
182 security instrument and selling same to Investor;
- 183 • Lender intended to defraud Investor and the taxpayers of the United States by  
184 withholding the lien document from the sale of the promissory note in order that  
185 Lender could then hold the lien for three years, then prepare and file Internal  
186 Revenue Form 1099a and falsely claim the full lien amount as abandoned funds  
187 and deduct same from Lender's income tax obligation;
- 188 • Lender defrauded backers of derivatives by betting on the failure of the promissory  
189 note the lender designed to default;
- 190 • participant Defendants, et al, in the securitization scheme described herein have  
191 devised business plans to reap millions of dollars in profits at the expense of  
192 Petitioner and others similarly situated.

193 **PETITIONER SEEKS REMEDY**

194 In addition to seeking compensatory, consequential and other damages, Petitioner seeks  
195 declaratory relief as to what (if any) party, entity or individual or group thereof is the  
196 owner of the promissory note executed at the time of the loan closing, and whether the  
197 Deed of Trust (Mortgage) secures any obligation of the Petitioner, and a Mandatory  
198 Injunction requiring re-conveyance of the subject property to the Petitioner or, in the  
199 alternative a Final Judgment granting Petitioner Quiet Title in the subject property.

200 ***PETITIONER HAS BEEN HARMED***

201 Petitioner has suffered significant harm and detriment as a result of the actions of Defendants.

202 Such harm and detriment includes economic and non-economic damages, and injuries to  
203 Petitioner's mental and emotional health and strength, all to be shown according to proof at trial.

204 In addition, Petitioner will suffer grievous and irreparable further harm and detriment unless the  
205 equitable relief requested herein is granted.



206 **STATEMENT OF CLAIM**

207 ***DEFENDANTS LACK STANDING***

208 **No evidence of Contractual Obligation**

209 Defendants claim a controversy based on a contractual violation by Petitioner but have failed to  
 210 produce said contract. Even if Defendants produced evidence of the existence of said contract in  
 211 the form of an allegedly accurate photocopy of said document, a copy is only hearsay evidence  
 212 that a contract actually existed at one point in time. A copy, considering the present state of  
 213 technology, could be easily altered. As Lender only created one original and that original was  
 214 left in the custody of Lender, it was imperative that Lender protect said instrument.

215 In as much as the Lender is required to present the original on demand of Petitioner, there can be  
 216 no presumption of regularity when the original is not so produced. In as much as Lender has  
 217 refused Petitioner's request of the chain of custody of the security instrument in question by  
 218 refusing to identify all current and past real parties in interest, there is no way to follow said  
 219 chain of custody to insure, by verified testimony, that no alterations to the original provisions in  
 220 the contract have been made. Therefore, the alleged copy of the original is only hearsay  
 221 evidence that an original document at one time existed. Petitioner maintains that, absent  
 222 production of admissible evidence of a contractual obligation on the part of Petitioner,  
 223 Defendants are without standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.

224 **No Proper Evidence of Agency**

225 Defendants claim agency to represent the principal in a contractual agreement involving  
 226 Petitioner, however, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence of said agency other than a  
 227 pronouncement that agency has been assigned by some person, the true identity and capacity of  
 228 whom has not been established. Defendants can hardly claim to be agents of a principal then  
 229 refuse to identify said principal. All claims of agency are made from the mouth of the agent with  
 230 no attempt to provide admissible evidence from the principal.

231 Absent proof of agency, Defendants lack standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the  
 232 court.



233           **Special Purpose Vehicle**

234       Since the entity now claiming agency to represent the holder of the security instrument is not the  
 235       original lender, Petitioner has reason to believe that the promissory note, upon consummation of  
 236       the contract, was converted to a security and sold into a special purpose vehicle and now resides  
 237       in a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) as defined by the Internal Revenue  
 238       Code and as such, cannot be removed from the REMIC as such would be a prohibited  
 239       transaction. If the mortgage was part of a special purpose vehicle and was removed on  
 240       consideration of foreclosure, the real party in interest would necessarily be the trustee of the  
 241       special purpose vehicle. Nothing in the pleadings of Defendants indicates the existence of a  
 242       special purpose vehicle, and the lack of a proper chain of custody documentation gives Petitioner  
 243       cause to believe defendant is not the proper agent of the real party in interest.

244           ***CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND THEFT***

245       Defendants, by and through Defendant's Agents, conspired with other Defendants, et al, toward  
 246       a criminal conspiracy to defraud Petitioner. Said conspiracy but are not limited to acts of  
 247       negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure, and tortuous  
 248       acts of conspiracy and theft, to include but not limited to, the assessment of improper fees to  
 249       Petitioner by Lender, which were then used to fund the improper payment of commission fees to  
 250       Agent in order to induce Agent to violate Agent's fiduciary duty to Petitioner.

251           ***AGENT PRACTICED UP-SELLING***

252       By and through the above alleged conspiracy, Agent practiced up-selling to Petitioner. In so  
 253       doing, Agent violated the trust relationship actively cultivated by Agent and supported by fact  
 254       that Agent was licensed by the state. Agent further defrauded Petitioner by failing to disclose  
 255       Agent's conspiratorial relationship to Lender, Agent violated Agent's fiduciary duty to  
 256       Petitioner and the duty to provide fair and honest services, through a series of carefully crafted  
 257       connivances, wherein Agent proactively made knowingly false and misleading statements of  
 258       alleged fact to Petitioner, and by giving partial disclosure of facts intended to directly mislead  
 259       Petitioner for the purpose of inducing Petitioner to make decisions concerning the acceptance of  
 260       a loan product offered by the Lender. Said loan product was more expensive than Petitioner  
 261       could legally afford. Agent acted with full knowledge that Petitioner would have made a  
 262       different decision had Agent given complete disclosure.

***FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT***

Lender maliciously induced Petitioner to accept a loan product, Lender knew, or should have known, Petitioner could not afford in order to unjustly enrich Lender.

***EXTRA PROFIT ON SALE OF PREDATORY LOAN PRODUCT***

Said more expensive loan product was calculated to produce a higher return when sold as a security to an investor who was already waiting to purchase the loan as soon as it could be consummated.

**Extra Commission for Late Payments**

Lender acted with deliberate malice in order to induce Petitioner to enter into a loan agreement that Lender intended Petitioner would have difficulty paying. The industry standard payment to the servicer for servicing a mortgage note is 3% of the amount collected. However, if the borrower is late on payments, a 5% late fee is added and this fee is retained by the servicer. Thereby, the Lender stands to receive more than double the regular commission on collections if the borrower pays late.

**Extra Income for Handling Foreclosure**

Lender acted with deliberate malice in order to induce petitioner to enter into a loan agreement on which Lender intended petitioner to default. In case of default, the Lender, acting as servicer, receives considerable funds for handling and executing the foreclosure process.

**Credit Default Swap Gambling**

Lender, after deliberately creating a loan intended to default is now in a position to bet on credit default swap, commonly referred to as a derivative as addressed more fully below. Since Lender designed the loan to fail, betting on said failure is essentially a sure thing.

***LENDER ATTEMPTING TO FRAUDULENTLY COLLECT ON VOID LIEN***

Lender sold the security instrument after closing and received consideration in an amount in excess of the lien held by Lender. Since Lender retained the lien document upon the sale of the security instrument, Lender separated the lien from said security instrument, creating a fatal and irreparable flaw.

290 When Lender received consideration while still holding the lien and said consideration was in  
291 excess of the amount of the lien, Lender was in a position such that he could not be harmed and  
292 could not gain standing to enforce the lien. The lien was, thereby, rendered void.

293 Since the separation of the lien from the security instrument creates such a considerable concern,  
294 said separation certainly begs a question: "Why would the Lender retain the lien when selling the  
295 security instrument?"

296 When you follow the money the answer is clear. The Lender will hold the lien for three years,  
297 then file an IRS Form 1099a and claim the full amount of the lien as abandoned funds and deduct  
298 the full amount from Lender's tax liability, thereby, receiving consideration a second time.

299 Later, in the expected eventuality of default by petitioner, Lender then claimed to transfer the  
300 lien to the holder of the security, however, the lien once satisfied, does not gain authority just  
301 because the holder, after receiving consideration, decides to transfer it to someone else.

#### 302 ***LENDER PROFIT BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP DERIVATIVES***

303 Lender further stood to profit by credit default swaps in the derivatives market, by way of inside  
304 information that Lender had as a result of creating the faulty loans sure to default. Lender was  
305 then free to invest on the bet that said loan would default and stood to receive unjust enrichment  
306 a third time. This credit default swap derivative market scheme is almost totally responsible for  
307 the stock market disaster we now experience as it was responsible for the stock market crash in  
308 1907.

#### 309 ***LENDER CHARGED FALSE FEES***

310 Lender charged fees to Petitioner that were in violation of the limitations imposed by the Real  
311 Estate Settlement Procedures Act as said fees were simply contrived and not paid to a third party  
312 vendor.

313 Lender charged other fees that were a normal part of doing business and should have been  
314 included in the finance charge.

315 Below is a listing of the fees charged at settlement. Neither at settlement, nor at any other time  
316 did Lender or Trustee provide documentation to show that the fees herein listed were valid,  
317 necessary, reasonable, and proper to charge Petitioner.

808	Application Fee	\$495.00
809	Processing Fee	\$595.00
810	Tax procurement tracking Fee	\$50.00
811	Tax Research payment service fee	\$31.00
901	Interest from 07/06/05 to 08/01/05 @ /day \$ 91.81	\$2,413.06
904	School tax escrow Fee	\$4,454.00
1101	Settlement fee	\$650.00
1108	Title insurance fee	\$3,515.00
1111	Flood determination Fee	\$13.00
1112	Wire Transfer Fee	\$35.00
1113	Underwriting Fee	\$405.00
1204	Discharge Fee	\$63.00
1303	Courier Fee	25.00
1304	Title Close Fee	350.00
1201	Recording Fee	\$97.00
1307	Mortgage Tax	1662.00
1202	City/county tax/stamp	\$6,650.00

318 Debtor is unable to determine whether or not the above fees are valid in accordance with the  
 319 restrictions provided by the various consumer protection laws. Therefore, please provide; a  
 320 complete billing from each vendor who provided the above listed services; the complete contact  
 321 information for each vendor who provided a billed service; clearly stipulate as to the specific  
 322 service performed; a showing that said service was necessary; a showing that the cost of said  
 323 service is reasonable; a showing of why said service is not a regular cost of doing business that  
 324 should rightly be included in the finance charge.

325 The above charges are hereby disputed and deemed unreasonable until such time as said charges  
 326 have been demonstrated to be reasonable, necessary, and in accordance with the limitations and  
 327 restrictions included in any and all laws, rules, and regulations intended to protect the consumer.

328 In the event lender fails to properly document the above charges, borrower will consider same as  
 329 false charges. The effect of the above amounts that borrower would pay over the life of the note  
 330 will be an overpayment of \$175,659.48 This amount will be reduced by the amount of items  
 331 above when said items are fully documented.

### 332 ***RESPA PENALTY***

333 From a cursory examination of the records, with the few available, the apparent RESPA  
 334 violations are as follows: Good Faith Estimate not within limits, No HUD-1 Booklet, Truth In  
 335 Lending Statement not within limits compared to Note, Truth in Lending Statement not timely  
 336 presented, HUD-1 not presented at least one day before closing, No Holder Rule Notice in Note,  
 337 No 1<sup>st</sup> Payment Letter.

338 The closing documents included no signed and dated : Financial Privacy Act Disclosure; Equal  
339 Credit Reporting Act Disclosure; notice of right to receive appraisal report; servicing disclosure  
340 statement; borrower's Certification of Authorization; notice of credit score; RESPA servicing  
341 disclosure letter; loan discount fee disclosure; business insurance company arrangement  
342 disclosure; notice of right to rescind.

343 The courts have held that the borrower does not have to show harm to claim a violation of the  
344 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, as the Act was intended to insure strict compliance. And,  
345 in as much as the courts are directed to assess a penalty of no less than two hundred dollars and  
346 no more than two thousand, considering the large number enumerated here, it is reasonable to  
347 consider that the court will assess the maximum amount for each violation.

348 Since the courts have held that the penalty for a violation of RESPA accrues at consummation of  
349 the note, borrower has calculated that, the number of violations found in a cursory examination  
350 of the note, if deducted from the principal, would result in an overpayment on the part of the  
351 borrower, over the life of the note, of \$209,909.90.

352 If the violation penalty amounts for each of the unsupported fees listed above are included, the  
353 amount by which the borrower would be defrauded is \$229,430.49

354 Adding in RESPA penalties for all the unsupported settlement fees along with the TILA/Note  
355 variance, it appears that lender intended to defraud borrower in the amount of \$776,349.71

356 ***LENDER CONSPIRED WITH APPRAISER***

357 Lender, in furtherance of the above referenced conspiracy, conspired with appraiser for the  
358 purpose of preparing an appraisal with a falsely stated price, in violation of appraiser's fiduciary  
359 duty to Petitioner and appraiser's duty to provide fair and honest services, for the purpose of  
360 inducing Petitioner to enter into a loan product that was fraudulent toward the interests of  
361 Petitioner.

362 ***LENDER CONSPIRED WITH TRUSTEE***

363 Lender conspired with the trust Agent at closing to create a condition of stress for the specific  
364 purpose of inducing Petitioner to sign documents without allowing time for Petitioner to read and  
365 fully understand what was being signed.

The above referenced closing procedure was a carefully crafted connivance, designed and intended to induce Petitioner, through shame and trickery, in violation of trustee's fiduciary duty to Petitioner and the duty to provide fair and honest services, to sign documents that Petitioner did not have opportunity to read and fully understand, thereby, denying Petitioner full disclosure as required by various consumer protection statutes.

### ***DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING AND OTHER UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES***

In the manner in which Defendants have carried on their business enterprises, they have engaged in a variety of unfair and unlawful business practices prohibited by *15 USC Section 45* et seq. (Deceptive Practices Act).

Such conduct comprises a pattern of business activity within the meaning of such statutes, and has directly and proximately caused Petitioner to suffer economic and non-economic harm and detriment in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

### ***EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR TILA AND RESPA***

The Limitations Period for Petitioners' Damages Claims under TILA and RESPA should be Equitably Told due to the DEFENDANTS' Misrepresentations and Failure to Disclose.

Any claims for statutory and other money damages under the Truth in Lending Act (*15 U.S.C. § 1601*, et. seq.) and under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (*12 U.S.C. § 2601* et. seq.) are subject to a one-year limitations period; however, such claims are subject to the equitable tolling doctrine. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the TILA limitations period in § 1640(e) as subject to equitable tolling. In *King v. California*, 784 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1986), the court held that given the remedial purpose of TILA, the limitations period should run from the date of consummation of the transaction, but that "the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or has reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosures that form the basis of the TILA action." *King v. California*, 784 F.2d 910, 915 9th Cir. 1986).

Likewise, while the Ninth Circuit has not taken up the question whether *12 U.S.C. § 2614*, the anti-kickback provision of **RESPA**, is subject to equitable tolling, other Courts have, and hold that such limitations period may be equitably tolled. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that § 2614 imposes a strictly jurisdictional limitation, *Hardin v. City Title &*

395 *Escrow Co.*, 797 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1986), while the Seventh Circuit came to the  
 396 opposite conclusion. *Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp.*, 118 F.3d 1157, 1164 (7th  
 397 Cir. 1997). District courts have largely come down on the side of the Seventh Circuit in holding  
 398 that the one-year limitations period in § 2614 is subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., *Kerby v.*  
 399 *Mortgage Funding Corp.*, 992 F.Supp. 787, 791-98 (D.Md.1998); *Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.*,  
 400 700 F.Supp. 1284, 1286-89 (S.D.N.Y.1988). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit, as noted above, has  
 401 interpreted the TILA limitations period in 15 U.S.C. § 1640 as subject to equitable tolling; the  
 402 language of the two provisions is nearly identical. *King v. California*, 784 F.2d at 914. While not  
 403 of precedential value, this Court has previously found both the TILA and **RESPA** limitations  
 404 periods to be subject to equitable tolling. *Blaylock v. First American Title Ins. Co.*, 504  
 405 F.Supp.2d 1091, (W.D. Wash. 2007). 1106-07.

406 The Ninth Circuit has explained that the doctrine of equitable tolling "focuses on excusable delay  
 407 by the Petitioner," and inquires whether "a reasonable Petitioner would ... have known of the  
 408 existence of a possible claim within the limitations period." *Johnson v. Henderson*, 314 F.3d  
 409 409, 414 (9th Cir.2002), *Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell*, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir.2000).  
 410 Equitable tolling focuses on the reasonableness of the Petitioner's delay and does not depend on  
 411 any wrongful conduct by the Defendants. *Santa Maria*. at 1178.

#### 412 **BUSINESS PRACTICES CONCERNING DISREGARDING OF UNDERWRITING** 413 **STANDARDS**

414 Traditionally, Lenders required borrowers seeking mortgage loans to document their income and  
 415 assets by, for example, providing W-2 statements, tax returns, bank statements, documents  
 416 evidencing title, employment information, and other information and documentation that could  
 417 be analyzed and investigated for its truthfulness, accuracy, and to determine the borrower's  
 418 ability to repay a particular loan over both the short and long term. Defendants deviated from and  
 419 disregarded these standards, particularly with regard to its riskier and more profitable loan  
 420 products.

#### 421 **Low-Documentation/No-Documentation Loans.**

422 Driven by its desire for market share and a perceived need to maintain competitiveness with the  
 423 likes of Countrywide, Defendants began to introduce an ever increasing variety of low and no  
 424 documentation loan products, including the HARMs and HELOCs described hereinabove, and  
 425 began to deviate from and ease its underwriting criteria, and then to grant liberal exceptions to  
 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 15 of 26



the already eased underwriting standards to the point of disregarding such standards. This quickened the loan origination process, allowing for the generation of more and more loans which could then be resold and/or securitized in the secondary market.

Defendants marketed no-documentation/low-documentation loan programs that included HARMs and HELOCs, among others, in which loans were given based on the borrower's "stated income" or "stated assets" (SISA) neither of which were verified. Employment was verbally confirmed, if at all, but not further investigated, and income, if it was even considered as a factor, was to be roughly consistent with incomes in the types of jobs in which the borrower was employed. When borrowers were requested to document their income, they were able to do so through information that was less reliable than in a full-documentation loan.

For stated income loans, it became standard practice for loan processors, loan officers and underwriters to rely on [www.salary.com](http://www.salary.com) to see if a stated income was reasonable. Such stated income loans, emphasizing loan origination from a profitability standpoint at the expense of determining the ability of the borrower to repay the loan from an underwriting standpoint, encouraged the overstating and/or fabrication of income.

#### **Easing of Underwriting Standards**

In order to produce more loans that could be resold in the secondary mortgage market, Defendants also relaxed, and often disregarded, traditional underwriting standards used to separate acceptable from unacceptable risk. Examples of such relaxed standards were reducing the base FICO score needed for a SISA loan.

Other underwriting standards that Defendants relaxed included qualifying interest rates (the rate used to determine whether borrowers can afford the loan), loan to value ratios (the amount of loan(s) compared to the appraised/sale price of the property, whichever is lower), and debt-to-income ratios (the amount of monthly income compared to monthly debt service payments and other monthly payment obligations).

With respect to HARMs, Defendants underwrote loans without regard to the borrower's long-term financial circumstances, approving the loan based on the initial fixed rate without taking into account whether the borrower could afford the substantially higher payment that would inevitably be required during the remaining term of the loan.

455 With respect to HELOCs, Defendants underwrote and approved such loans based only on the  
456 borrower's ability to afford the interest-only payment during the initial draw period of the loan,  
457 rather than on the borrower's ability to afford the subsequent, fully amortized principal and  
458 interest payments.

459 As Defendants pushed to expand market share, they eased other basic underwriting standards.  
460 For example, higher loan-to-value (LTV) and combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios were  
461 allowed. Likewise, higher debt-to-income (DTI) ratios were allowed. At the same time that they  
462 eased underwriting standards the Defendants also were encouraging consumers to go further into  
463 debt in order to supply the very lucrative aftermarket of mortgage backed securities. The relaxed  
464 underwriting standards created the aftermarket supply they needed. As a result, the Defendants  
465 made it easy for the unwary consumer to take on more debt than he could afford by encouraging  
466 unsound financial practices, all the while knowing defaults would occur more and more  
467 frequently as the credit ratios of citizens reached the limit of the new relaxed underwriting  
468 standards.

469 Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, from its own  
470 underwriting guidelines industry standards that it was accumulating and selling/reselling risky  
471 loans that were likely to end up in default. However, as the pressure mounted to increase market  
472 share and originate more loans, Defendants began to grant "exceptions" even to its relaxed  
473 underwriting guidelines. Such was the environment that loan officers and underwriters were,  
474 from time to time, placed in the position of having to justify why they did not approve a loan that  
475 failed to meet underwriting criteria.

#### 476 **Risk Layering**

477 Defendants compromised its underwriting even further by risk layering, i.e. combining high risk  
478 loans with one or more relaxed underwriting standards.

479 Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that layered risk  
480 would increase the likelihood of default. Among the risk layering Defendants engaged in were  
481 approving HARM loans with little to no down payment, little to no documentation, and high  
482 DTI/LTV/CLTV ratios. Despite such knowledge, Defendants combined these very risk factors in  
483 the loans it promoted to borrowers.

Loan officers and mortgage Agents aided and abetted this scheme by working closely with other mortgage Lenders/mortgage bankers to increase loan originations, knowing or having reason to believe that Defendants and other mortgage Lenders/mortgage bankers with whom they did business ignored basic established underwriting standards and acted to mislead the borrower, all to the detriment of the borrower and the consumer of loan products..

Petitioner is informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them, engaged and/or actively participated in, authorized, ratified, or had knowledge of, all of the business practices described above in paragraphs 30-42 of this Complaint

#### ***UNJUST ENRICHMENT***

Petitioner is informed and believes that each and all of the Defendants received a benefit at Petitioner's expense, including but not limited to the following: To the Agent, commissions, yield spread premiums, spurious fees and charges, and other "back end" payments in amounts to be proved at trial; To the originating Lender, commissions, incentive bonuses, resale premiums, surcharges and other "back end" payments in amounts to be proved at trial; To the investors, resale premiums, and high rates of return; To the servicers including EMS, servicing fees, percentages of payment proceeds, charges, and other "back end" payments in amounts to be proved at trial; To all participants, the expectation of future revenues from charges, penalties and fees paid by Petitioner when the unaffordable LOAN was foreclosed or refinanced.

By their misrepresentations, omissions and other wrongful acts alleged heretofore, Defendants, and each of them, were unjustly enriched at the expense of Petitioner, and Petitioner was unjustly deprived, and is entitled to restitution in the amount of \$776,349.71

#### ***CLAIM TO QUIET TITLE.***

Petitioner properly averred a claim to quiet title. Petitioner included both the street address, and the Assessor's Parcel Number for the property. Petitioner has set forth facts concerning the title interests of the subject property. Moreover, as shown above, Petitioner's claims for rescission and fraud are meritorious. As such, Petitioner's bases for quiet title are meritorious as well.

Defendants have no title, estate, lien, or interest in the Subject Property in that the purported power of sale contained in the Deed of Trust is of no force or effect because Defendants' security interest in the Subject Property has been rendered void and that the Defendants are not the holder

in due course of the Promissory Note. Moreover, because Petitioner properly pled all Defendants' involvement in a fraudulent scheme, all Defendants are liable for the acts of its co-conspirators,

"a Petitioner is entitled to damages from those Defendants who concur in the tortuous scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose." *Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co.*, 24 Cal. 3d 773, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45 (1979); *Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.*, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27 (1st Dist. 2006); *Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp.*, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1571, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752 (2d Dist. 1995).

### **SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING**

Petitioner has sufficiently pled that relief can be granted on each and every one of the Complaint's causes of action. A complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the Petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of Petitioner claim which would entitle Petitioner to relief." *Housley v. U.S.* (9th Cir. Nev. 1994) 35 F.3d 400, 401. "All allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Petitioner." *Argabright v. United States*, 35 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996).

Attendant, the Complaint includes a "short, plain statement, of the basis for relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a). The Complaint contains cognizable legal theories, sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories, and seeks remedies to which Petitioner is entitled. *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); *King v. California*, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the legal conclusions in the Complaint can and should be drawn from the facts alleged, and, in turn, the court should accept them as such. *Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network*, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir, 1994). Lastly, Petitioner's complaint contains claims and has a probable validity of proving a "set of facts" in support of their claim entitling them to relief. *Housley v. U.S.* (9th Cir. Nev. 1994) 35 F.3d 400, 401. Therefore, relief as requested herein should be granted.

### **CAUSES OF ACTION**

#### **BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY**

Defendants Agent, appraiser, trustee, Lender, et al, and each of them, owed Petitioner a fiduciary duty of care with respect to the mortgage loan transactions and related title activities involving the Trust Property.

Defendants breached their duties to Petitioner by, *inter alia*, the conduct described above. Such breaches included, but were not limited to, ensuring their own and Petitioners' compliance with all applicable laws governing the loan transactions in which they were involved, including but not limited to, TILA, HOEPA, **RESPA** and the Regulations X and Z promulgated there under.

Defendant's breaches of said duties were a direct and proximate cause of economic and non-economic harm and detriment to Petitioner(s).

Petitioner did suffer economic, non-economic harm, and detriment as a result of such conduct, all to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

***CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE/NEGLIGENCE PER SE***

Defendants owed a general duty of care with respect to Petitioners, particularly concerning their duty to properly perform due diligence as to the loans and related transactional issues described hereinabove.

In addition, Defendants owed a duty of care under TILA, HOEPA, **RESPA** and the Regulations X and Z promulgated there under to, among other things, provide proper disclosures concerning the terms and conditions of the loans they marketed, to refrain from marketing loans they knew or should have known that borrowers could not afford or maintain, and to avoid paying undue compensation such as "yield spread premiums" to mortgage Agents and loan officers.

Defendants knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the loan transactions involving Petitioner and other persons similarly situated were defective, unlawful, violative of federal and state laws and regulations, and would subject Petitioner to economic and non-economic harm and other detriment.

Petitioner is among the class of persons that TILA, HOEPA, **RESPA** and the Regulations X and Z promulgated there under were intended and designed to protect, and the conduct alleged against Defendants is the type of conduct and harm which the referenced statutes and regulations were designed to deter.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Petitioner suffered economic and non-economic harm in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.

**AGENT: COMMON LAW FRAUD**

If any Agents' misrepresentations made herein were not intentional, said misrepresentations were negligent. When the Agents made the representations alleged herein, he/she/it had no reasonable ground for believing them to be true.

Agents made these representations with the intention of inducing Petitioner to act in reliance on these representations in the manner hereafter alleged, or with the expectation that Petitioner would so act.

Petitioner is informed and believes that Agent et al, facilitated, aided and abetted various Agents in their negligent misrepresentation, and that various Agents were negligent in not implementing procedures such as underwriting standards oversight that would have prevented various Agents from facilitating the irresponsible and wrongful misrepresentations of various Agents to Defendants.

Petitioner is informed and believes that Agent acted in concert and collusion with others named herein in promulgating false representations to cause Petitioner to enter into the LOAN without knowledge or understanding of the terms thereof.

As a proximate result of the negligent misrepresentations of Agents as herein alleged, the Petitioner sustained damages, including monetary loss, emotional distress, loss of credit, loss of opportunities, attorney fees and costs, and other damages to be determined at trial. As a proximate result of Agents' breach of duty and all other actions as alleged herein, Defendants has suffered severe emotional distress, mental anguish, harm, humiliation, embarrassment, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to Petitioner's damage in an amount to be established at trial.

**PETITIONER PROPERLY AVERRED A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.**

Petitioner properly pled Defendants violated the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." *Price v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989); Rest.2d Contracts § 205. A mortgage Agent has fiduciary duties. *Wyatt v.*



597 *Union Mortgage Co., (1979) 24 Cal. 3d. 773. Further, In Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v*  
598 *Jones, (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 917, the court stated:*

599 In the area of insurance contracts the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has taken on a  
600 particular significance, in part because of the special relationship between the insurer and the  
601 insured. The insurer, when determining whether to settle a claim, must give at least as much  
602 consideration to the welfare of its insured as it gives to its own interests. . . The standard is  
603 premised on the insurer's obligation to protect the insured's interests . . . *Id. at 937.*

604 Likewise, there is a special relationship between an Agent and borrower. "A person who  
605 provides Agency services to a borrower in a covered loan transaction by soliciting Lenders or  
606 otherwise negotiating a consumer loan secured by real property, is the fiduciary of the  
607 consumer...this fiduciary duty [is owed] to the consumer regardless of whom else the Agent may  
608 be acting as an Agent for . . . The fiduciary duty of the Agent is to deal with the consumer in  
609 *good faith*. If the *Agent knew or should have known that the Borrower will or has a likelihood of*  
610 *defaulting ... they have a fiduciary duty to the borrower not to place them in that loan."*  
611 (California Department of Real Estate, *Section 8: Fiduciary Responsibility*, [www.dre.ca.gov](http://www.dre.ca.gov)).  
612 [*Emphasis Added*].

613 All Defendants, willfully breached their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with  
614 Petitioner when Defendants: (1) Failed to provide all of the proper disclosures; (2) Failed to  
615 provide accurate Right to Cancel Notices; (3) Placed Petitioner into Petitioner's current loan  
616 product without regard for other more affordable products; (4) Placed Petitioner into a loan  
617 without following proper underwriting standards; (5) Failed to disclose to Petitioner that  
618 Petitioner was going to default because of the loan being unaffordable; (6) Failed to perform  
619 valid and /or properly documented substitutions and assignments so that Petitioner could  
620 ascertain Petitioner rights and duties; and (7) Failed to respond in good faith to Petitioner's  
621 request for documentation of the servicing of Petitioner's loan and the existence and content of  
622 relevant documents. Additionally, Defendants breached their implied covenant of good faith and  
623 fair dealing with Petitioner when Defendants initiated foreclosure proceedings even without the  
624 right under an alleged power of sale because the purported assignment was not recorded and by  
625 willfully and knowingly financially profiting from their malfeasance. Therefore, due to the  
626 special relationship inherent in a real estate transaction between Agent and borrower, *and* all  
627 Defendants' participation in the conspiracy, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.



***CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 15 U.S.C. §1601 ET  
SEQ***

Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference, re-pleads and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in all of the paragraphs of the General Allegations and Facts Common to All Causes of Action as though the same were set forth herein.

Petitioner is informed and believes that Defendant's violation of the provisions of law rendered the credit transaction null and void, invalidates Defendant's claimed interest in the Subject Property, and entitles Petitioner to damages as proven at trial.

***INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS***

The conduct committed by Defendants, driven as it was by profit at the expense of increasingly highly leveraged and vulnerable consumers who placed their faith and trust in the superior knowledge and position of Defendants, was extreme and outrageous and not to be tolerated by civilized society.

Defendants either knew that their conduct would cause Petitioner to suffer severe emotional distress, or acted in conscious and/or reckless disregard of the probability that such distress would occur.

Petitioner did in fact suffer severe emotional distress as an actual and proximate result of the conduct of Defendants as described hereinabove.

As a result of such severe emotional distress, Petitioner suffered economic and non economic harm and detriment, all to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

Petitioner demands that Defendants provide Petitioner with release of lien on the lien signed by Petitioner and secure to Petitioner quite title;

Petitioner demands Defendants disgorge themselves of all enrichment received from Petitioner as payments to Defendants based on the fraudulently secured promissory note in an amount to be calculated by Defendants and verified to Petitioner;

Petitioner further demands that Defendants pay to Petitioner an amount equal to treble the amount Defendants intended to defraud Petitioner of which amount Petitioner calculated to be equal to \$2,329,049.13

**REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION**

Plaintiff will suffer imminent and irreparable injury if defendant is not enjoined from foreclosing on the property owned by Plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); *see Sampson v. Murray*, 415 U.S. 61, 88-89 & n.59, 94 S. Ct. 937, 951-52 & n.59 (1974).

There is no adequate remedy at law because once the foreclosure sale has taken place Plaintiff will suffer the complete loss of the property as defendant will sell the property to a third party who will have a right to possession without regard to the claims Plaintiff has against defendant. {*See N. Cal. Power Agency v. Grace Geothermal Corp.*, 469 U.S. 1306, 1306, 105 S. Ct. 459, 459 (1984); *Wilson v. Ill. S. Ry. Co.*, 263 U.S. 574, 576-77, 44 S. Ct. 203, 203-04 (1924); *Winston v. Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Un. No. 89*, 879 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Ky. 1995).

There is a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits. *Schiavo v. Schiavo*, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff will be able to show that:

Defendant has no agency to represent the real party in interest;

- that the alleged real party in interest is unable to prove standing foreclose against and sell the property;
- that the lender committed numerous acts, as listed above, that have the effect of rendering the contract, through which defendant claims authority, void and unenforceable.

The threatened harm to plaintiff outweighs the harm that a preliminary injunction would inflict on defendant. *Schiavo*, 403 F.3d at 1225-26. If defendant is temporarily restrained from selling the instant property, the defendant an plaintiff will benefit as if plaintiff is forced to vacate the property, the property will sit empty for the duration of the action. Plaintiff will suffer loss of the use of said property and will lose opportunity to maintain same and defendant will suffer loss by having to maintain an empty property that cannot be insured.

Issuance of a preliminary injunction would not adversely affect the public interest and public policy because there are already a great number of empty houses with the current residential foreclosure mess. Adding more will simply increase the burden on the local as it will create opportunity for vandalism and further other criminal activity.

685 Plaintiff is willing to post a bond in the amount the court deems appropriate.

686 The court should enter this preliminary injunction without notice to defendant because  
 687 plaintiff will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage if the order is not granted  
 688 before defendant can be heard as **defendant has made it known that the sale of the above**  
 689 **mentioned property is imminent.** *First Tech. Safety Sys. v. Depinet*, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th  
 690 Cir. 1993). If said sale is allowed to take place, Plaintiff will be irreparably harm. {See  
 691 *O'Connor's Federal Rules, "Ex parte," ch. 2-D, §3.1.3, p. 77.*}

692 Plaintiff asks the court to set the request for a preliminary injunction for hearing at the  
 693 earliest possible time.

### 694 CONCLUSION


695 13. Plaintiff has filed suit against defendant wherein Plaintiff has claimed numerous causes  
 696 of action against defendant. A number of the allegations made by Plaintiff are incontrovertable  
 697 by defendant, therefore, Plaintiff will prevail on a number of the above allegations by way if  
 698 existing records. For these reasons, plaintiff asks the court to issue a preliminary injunction  
 699 preventing defendant from foreclosing on the property.

### 700 PRAYER

701 15. For these reasons, plaintiff asks that the court do the following:

- 702 a. Defendant be prevented from foreclosing on and selling the property until and  
 703 unless defendant prevails in the current litigation.
- 704 b. Enter judgment for plaintiff.
- 705 c. Award costs of court.
- 706 d. Grant any other relief it deems appropriate.

707 **Respectfully Submitted,**

708 

709 **Enid Futterman**  
 710  
 711

NY STATE  
County of Columbia

**VERIFICATION**

I, Enid Futterman, do swear and affirm that all statements made herein are true and accurate, in all respects, to the best of my knowledge.

Enid Futterman  
661 Route 23  
Craryville, NY

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME, Sharon J. Melino, by Enid S. Futterman, on the 18 day of August, 2010, which witnesses my hand and seal of office.

Sharon J. Melino  
**NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR**  
**THE STATE OF NEW YORK**

Notary Stamp

SHARON J. MELINO  
Notary Public, State of New York  
Qualified in Columbia County  
Reg. No. 04ME6107000  
My Commission Expires March 15, 2012